# Timeline

### 1:10-1:20 (10 minutes) lead by Linfeng and Chen

* Introduction and Author Overview
  + Schelling
  + Camerer
  + Easley, D.
  + Kleinberg, J.
* Display Learning Goals

### 1:20-1:40 (20 minutes) lead by Tanya (Linfeng and Chen)

* A short game about the game theory:
  + ‘Guess 2/3 of the average’
* Formalize structure of games, and
* Present some important Games
  + ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’
  + ‘Zero-Sum Games’
  + ‘Battle of the Sexes’
  + ‘Chicken or Hawk versus Dove’
* Answer questions about these Games

### 1:40-2:20 (40 minutes) lead by Tanya

* Lecture based on "Networks, Crowds, and Markets"
  + Solution concept: Iterated Deletion
* Questions? If no question, let's do an activity (quiz)

### 2:20-2:30 (10 minutes)

* Break

### 2:30-2:50 (20 minutes) lead by Tanya

* Lecture based on "Networks, Crowds, and Markets", counted.
  + Solution concept: Nash Equilibrium
* Questions? If no question, let’s do an activity (quiz)

### 2:50-3:10 (20 minutes) lead by Linfeng and Chen

* Tacit Coordination Games, an example with 7 equilibria.
  + Solve and explain

### 3:10-3:30 (20 minutes) lead by Tanya

* Draw connection to ‘Behavioral Game Theory’, wrap up.

### 3:30-3:40 (10 minutes) lead by Linfeng and Chen

* Lecture about ‘Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War’
  + Jump out of the pure game theory context and check out real-world contexts/conditions

Refer to slides for more on this.

### 3:40-3:50 (10 minutes) lead by Linfeng and Chen

* Open Question (if applicable)

### 3:50-4:00 (10 minutes) lead by Linfeng and Chen

* Reflection

# Schelling’s piece:

Here goes the content of reflection on Schelling’s piece. Shall trim these into PPT-Slides. I will probably use some of the contents in my response paper.

This is wired paragraph indentation, but fine.

Body Text:

This early piece of Schelling’s work is neither representative (of Schelling’s work) nor popular (among other writings of Schelling’s as well as others’ works on the same topic).

[Citation plot on this?]

Most popular paper: <https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&num=100&ie=UTF-8&q=Dynamic+Models+of+Segregation>

Other works: <https://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=TC+Schelling&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&hl=en&as_sdt=0,23>

Nevertheless, it covers nearly everything about game theory that has been formally studied later.

1. Individual interest: common interests vs conflict interests
2. Communication and signaling
3. Strategic games under Incomplete information
4. Payoffs that include externality and identity (fairness)
5. Etc

The takeaway from Schelling’s piece:

* Under the contexts of limited war where communication channels are scarce and unreliable:
  + Should simplify payoff scheme (completing banning against nukes)
  + Should simplify strategy profiles (as suggested: to make creditable decisions through unilateral actions)